Ghost of a flea

We live in interesting times (as have all people).

Perhaps mounting China's ICBM's as close to the equator as possible gives them an even longer range?

Perhaps also, use of an island for military purposes gives an already secrecy-obsessed society even more perceived control?

There is a pretty simple explanation. First it's important to note that the nukes located on Hainan are there in the form of SSBN-based ICBMs, not land-based silos.

Most of China's northern ports are effectively monitored by Cold War-era SOSUS (sonar surveillance) nets stretching down the Kamchatka peninsula to Hokkaido, and again from Kyushu to the Philippines. In effect the PRC is liberally ringed (on the seaward side) with US allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, none of whom will be shy about letting the USN know when PLAAN boomers transit their waters.

Second, the bathymetry of the Sea of Japan and East China Sea shows that it's pretty shallow; the continental shelf extends way out to the Ryuku Ridge between Japan and Taiwan. To help avoid satellite and ASW-MAD detection the subs need to get deep, and there is scant opportunity to do that in ports that are not also adjacent to US allies. Except at Hainan, where you've got the edge of the continental shelf a short distance away, and the opportunity to skirt the southern end of the Philippines and avoid the SOSUS system farther north.

Hainan is the obvious choice if the PLAAN wants their boomers to have a shot at making it to the open sea before US allies ID and locate them. Anywhere else and they'd be ID'ed and tracked before they left the PRC's backyard.

"There is a pretty simple explanation. First it's important to note that the nukes located on Hainan are there in the form of SSBN-based ICBMs, not land-based silos."

And here I thought I was being quite clever.

The beauty of networked intelligence! We now know more about the subject than - to hazard a guess - any member of Canada's federal Cabinet. Unless they read the comments, of course.

I figured all those years of playing Harpoon would eventually pay off somehow.

Actually on second reading I should note that the article merely says near-term placement of up to half of China's nuclear forces near the South China Sea.

"Nuclear forces" is pretty generic and isn't just ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers... it's also nuclear-capable artillery, tactical aircraft, and theater-range missiles (whether ship-launched or shore-launched).

I forgot China's only got 1 or 2 SSBNs in service right now, but they do have a gigantic naval port at Yulin which also houses a squadron of J-11 fighter/bombers, capable of delivering nukes.

The article does mention that the new Type 094 SSBNs will be based out of Hainan though.

I am particularly impressed by your knowledge of the continental shelf. An extended discussion may be found here. It may be I have grossly underestimated China's SSN/SSBN/SSK capability... this could be a Dreadnought problem in the making.

By 2010 the U.S. could be facing a new PLAN submarine fleet of about 10 SSNs, 5-6 SSBNs, and assuming the production of 5 Yuans, about 27 new very capable non-nuclear submarines. In addition, the PLAN may retain most of about 20 older but still effective Type 035 "Ming" class non-nuclear submarines, for a potential total approaching 50 to 60 attack submarines alone. Today the U.S. Navy only has 55 attack submarines to cover its global security commitments. Shockingly, there were suggestions from within the Navy in early 2004 that this fleet could be reduced to 37 in order to pay for newer submarines.[9] While three Los Angeles class SSNs have been moved to Guam, this is only sufficient to support one submarine continuously deployed. According to some sources budget cutters apparently reduced this number from six. However, China’s projected submarine fleet build-up makes the current U.S. SSN fleet of 55 SSNs seem inadequate.

I have a minor interest in marine geology courtesy of a few books by Dr. Robert Ballard, but anyone who has ever played a submarine simulation game knows that your diving depth is limited to about 300ft on the continental shelf... that's barely out of range of seagull crap and puts one at risk of sonar and MAD detection. Most attack subs these days are rated to dive 1,800-2,000 feet.

I don't think the StrategyCenter guys are quite on the ball for your linked assessment.

First and foremost I don't believe the PLAN seeks to emulate the Soviet Navy in strategic or tactical thought. The Soviets aspired to global reach but, aside from subs, were largely bottlenecked in their bastions. I don't think the PLAN is stupid enough to aim at such low standards.

China has made no secret of its desire to seek great power status, and they are going emulate the superpower whose tactics and doctrine were and are dominant today: the United States. I am positive that PLAN admirals will seek to emulate USN blue- and brown-water expeditionary capability just as young PLAAF generals seek to emulate USAF capabilities and doctrine. They aren't dense; they know what works and has been combat-proven.

I do think StrategyCenter's assessment of Taiwan is spot on though, and taking Taiwan ought to be a precursor to any serious fleet action. With Taiwan out of the game, PLAN is no longer restricted to operating close to shore and has easy access to the rest of the Pacific.